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SUBJECT: PRESS INTERVIEW WITH ALI MURTOPO

1. THE AUGUST 23 EDITION OF THE FINANCIAL REVIEW CARRIES
THE FIRST OF A THREE-PART SERIES ON AUSTRALIAN-INDONESIAN
RELATIONS. THE FIRST STORY CONSISTS ENTIRELY OF AN INTERVIEW
WITH ALI MURTOPO. THE TEXT OF THE ARTICLE APPEARS BELOW:

2. QTE THE FRASER GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO FORCE ITS OWN VALUES
ON INDONESIA OVER TIMOR, SAYS LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ALI PURTOPO.
END QTE.

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3. QTE GENERAL MURTOPO, DEPUTY STATE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND A CLOSE ADVISER TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLICY ON TIMOR AND CHINA IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE FINANCIAL REVIEW, THE TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS: END QTE

4. QTE THE INTERVIEW IS THE STRONGEST INDONESIAN PUBLIC REACTION SO FAR TO THE FRASER GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SOLIDLY OPPOSE JAKARTA'S TAKEOVER OF THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONY, AND TO CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES AND AN ACT OF SELF DETERMINATION BY THE TIMORESE, AND IT HIGHLIGHTS THE DELICATE STATE OF THE CANBERRA-JAKARTA DIALOGUE.

5. QTE SINCE THE INDONESIAN TAKEOVER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER, MR. ANDREW PEACOCK, HAS SAID THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT INNER QTE CANNOT REGARD THE BROAD REQUIREMENTS FOR A SATISFACTORY PROCESS OF DECOLONISATION AS HAVING BEEN MET. END INNER QTE

6. QTE IN THE INTERVIEW, GENERAL MURTOPOL MAKES THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

7. QTE AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY HARBOURED COMMUNIST ELEMENTS WHICH WERE ABLE TO ORGANISE AGAINST INDONESIAN MOVES ON TIMOR, AND AGAINST THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT.

8. QTE THE WHITLAM GOVERNMENT BETTER UNDERSTOOD INDONESIA THAN THE FRASER GOVERNMENT.

9. QTE WHATEVER THE DIFFERENT POLICIES OF THE FRASER GOVERNMENT, STRATEGICALLY IT NEEDED CO-OPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA.

10. QTE THE FRASER GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON TIMOR WAS NOT REALISTIC IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS SINCE THE INDONESIAN TAKEOVER.

11. QTE SOME PEOPLE IN INDONESIA WERE UPSET AT THE LEAKED REMARKS OF MR. FRASER IN PEKING ABOUT INNER QTE THE NATURE OF THE REGIME END INNER QTE IN JAKARTA, AND FELT MR. FRASER DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA OR THINK LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ABOUT THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP.

12. QTE ANY SUGGESTION OF A FOUR-POWER NAVAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS.

13. QTE HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT INDONESIA DID NOT GO ALONG

WITH MR. FRASER'S OPEN-DOOR ATTITUDE TO CHINA, WHICH INDONESIA SAW AS A SUPER POWER ALSO THREATENING THE SOUTH-EAST ASIAN REGION.

14. QTE HERE IS THE TEXT, SLIGHTED EDITED, OF GENERAL MURTOPO'S COMMENTS TO THE FINANCIAL REVIEW:

QTESTION: WHY DID THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDE LAST DECEMBER THAT VOLUNTEER FORCES SHOULD BE SENT TO PORTUGUESE TIMOR?

ANSWER: IT WAS NOT DECIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THAT AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI OF THE SITUATION. SO THE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THE SITUATION THAT DEVELOPED ABOUT THE VOLUNTEERS.

AT THE EARLIEST IN THE DECISION OF THE PORTUGUESE TO APPLY A DECOLONISATION POLICY, I TRIED TO APPROACH THE PORTUGUESE TO DISCUSS THIS. I HAVE MET ALL THE TOP OFFICIALS - THE PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER MINISTERS INVOLVED WITH DECOLONISATION.

WE HAD A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DECOLONISATION OPTIONS WILL BE THREE.

THE FIRST OPTION WAS THAT THE PEOPLE OF TIMOR WILL HAVE INDEPENDENCE STILL THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION, BECAUSE FOR MANY REASONS ABSOLUTE INDEPENDENCE IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTIES THE PEOPLE FACE LOCALLY.

THE SECOND WAS THAT THE TIMOR PEOPLE WILL BE AN INDEPENDENT NATION, BUT KNOWING THE SITUATION, KNOWING THE POTENTIALITIES OF THE TIMOR AREA, THEY (THE PEOPLE) COULD NOT PROVIDE THE SUSTAINING FACTORS FOR THIS IDEA.

THE THIRD OPTION WAS THAT, HAVING REGARD FOR THE TIMOR STRUGGLE IN 1945 TO JOIN INDONESIA AND AGAIN IN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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1959-60, THIS WOULD BE THE THIRD OPTION. THIS OPTION WAS UNDERSTOOD ON BOTH SIDES.

IT WAS ALSO UNDERSTOOD BY US THAT PORTUGAL AND INDONESIA WOULD CONSULT IN EVERY STEP IN THE FRAMEWORK OF DECOLONISATION. WE HAVE MANY TIMES ARRANGED MEETINGS IN PORTUGAL, IN LONDON AND IN OTHER AREAS.

ON TIMOR, THE PORTUGUESE BROKE THE RULES WITHOUT CONSULTING US. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY GAVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE UDT (THE TIMOR POLITICAL FACTION MOST SYMPATHETIC TO PORTUGAL) TO TAKE OVER THE ADMINISTRATION, THE GOVERNMENT, WITHOUT CONSULTING US.

ONLY A FEW DAYS BEFORE THAT I HAD TALKED WITH THE UDT LEADERS, AND BEFORE THAT WITH THE FRETELIN LEADERS

THAT WHATEVER THE SOLUTION WILL BE, THE INDONESIAN VIEW

WAS THAT THERE MUST BE CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AREA, AND ALSO CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND INDONESIA.

SO THIS WAS THE UNDERSTANDING. BUT THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN STEPS WITHOUT CONSULTING US.

IT WAS AGREED AT THE TIME THAT THE DECOLONISATION PROCESS WOULD TAKE TIME, AND IT WAS MENTIONED THAT THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT NEEDED ABOUT TWO TO THREE YEARS.

WE ADVISED THEM AT THE TIME THAT IF THE PORTUGUESE TOOK SUCH A LONG TIME TO FACILITATE THE MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE INDEPENDENT, I AM NOT SURE THAT PEOPLE WOULD CONTINUE WITH THE DISCIPLINE, WITH THE REGULATIONS THAT THE PORTUGUESE WANT.

BECAUSE I SEE THE WEAKNESS OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT THERE. I KNEW THAT THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT ON TIMOR WAS NOT ABLE TO CONTROL THE WHOLE AREA, AND ALSO THERE WAS THE EMOTION OF THE PEOPLE.

FROM SUCH A SOCIETY YOU CAN IMAGINE WHAT EMOTIONS THEY HAVE IF THEY HAVE THE CHANCE TO BE FREE IN MOVEMENT.

ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT IT WAS ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT AMONG THE PARTIES IN DILI YOU HAVE THE TRADITIONAL GROUPS, THE APODETI, AND THIS GROUP WAS FIGHTING AGAINST THE COLONIAL POWER TO BE INDEPENDENT, INTEGRATED WITH INDONESIA.

THAT IS THE APODITI, THE TRADITIONAL SOCIETY, AND THAT IS THE POLITICAL PARTY WITH THE MOST FOLLOWERS, BUT NOT THE MOST CLEVER PEOPLE, BECAUSE MOST ARE TRADITIONAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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LEADERS.

QUESTION: THE FACT REMAINS THAT TOWARDS THE END OF LAST YEAR AFTER THE CIVIL WAR FRETILIN CAME OUT ON TOP. FRETILIN WANTED INDEPENDENCE. MANY SAID IT WAS A LEFTWARD LEANING GOVERNMENT. DO YOU THINK FRETILIN POSED A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF INDONESIA?

ANSWER: IT DEPENDED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRETILIN ITSELF.

NOW YOU KNOW THAT FRETILIN IS ONLY SUPPORTED BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. NORTH KOREA, CAMBODIA AND LAOS ARE SUPPORTING THEM.

IT MEANS THAT FRETILIN WANTED TO ESTABLISH A COMMUNIST COUNTRY, A LEFTIST COUNTRY, OR WHATEVER YOU WANT TO CALL IT.

ANYHOW, IT WOULD BE A POWER THAT WOULD HAVE DISTURBED THE STABILITY OF THIS AREA. OF THIS I AM SURE.

THAT IS WHY WE WANT TO REDUCE THAT THREAT. IF POSSIBLE, WE WANT TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE PORTUGUESE AND WITH FRETILIN.

THAT IS WHY WE AGREE TO SUPPORT THE CONFERENCE IN MACAO. BUT FRETILIN DIDN'T WANT TO ATTEND THIS CONFERENCE.

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QUESTION: REVERTING TO THE QUESTION OF FRETILIN. AS YOU KNOW, THE FRASER GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF THE ACT OF FREE CHOICE IN TIMOR - THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS SAID IT WAS UNSTATIFACTORY. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO TIMOR?

ANSWER: I KNOW THE SITUATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATION, BECAUSE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRACY AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY. SO IT MEANS THAT EVERYBODY CAN TALK AS HE THINKS REGARDING HIS OWN IDEAS.

BUT I AM SURE ALSO THAT THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT IS SINCERE TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA. THAT IS WHY THE PROBLEM NOW IS HOW THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS ITS OWN PEOPLE NOT TO DISTURB THE STRATEGY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

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WE KNOW THAT THE STRUGGLE IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS AUSTRALIA IS ON DEMOCRATIC LINES. IT IS NOT EASY TO LET THE PEOPLE TALK ONLY WHAT THE GOVERNMENT WANTS.

I AM SURE ALSO THAT AMONG YOUR SOCIETY IN AUSTRALIA YOU HAVE ELEMENTS OF COMMUNISTS. THIS HAS ALSO BEEN PROVED BY THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT.

AFTER ALL, THEY MADE THE INVESTIGATION THAT CERTAIN SUPPORTING ELEMENTS OF THE COMMUNISTS WERE STAYING IN AUSTRALIA. THIS IS PROVEN.

QUESTION: SUPPORTING THE COMMUNISTS IN TIMOR?

ANSWER: NOT ONLY IN TIMOR, I THINK. IN SINGAPORE ALSO. SO IT MEANS THAT THE AUSTRALIA YOU HAVE THE CENTRE TO ORGANISE THE COMMUNIST CADRES.

IF NOW CERTAIN PEOPLE IN AUSTRALIA ARE STILL AGAINST THE INDONESIAN POLICY ON TIMOR, I AM SURE THAT IDEA CAME FROM SUCH GROUPS.

IF THEY ARE COMMUNISTS OR NOT, 8 \$9 ,95 (,92, BUT THE IDEAS I CAN ONLY IDENTIFY AS COMMUNIST.

QUESTION: DID YOU UNDERSTAND THE WHITLAM GOVERNMENT TO HAVE A DIFFERENT POLICY ON TIMOR THAN THE PRESENT FRASER GOVERNMENT?

ANSWER: I DON'T WANT TO SEPARATE THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF TODAY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN NATIONS.

QUESTION: I APPRECIATE WHAT YOU ARE SAYING, BUT IT HAS BEEN REPORTED IN AUSTRALIA THAT MR. WHITLAM AS PRIME MINISTER TOOK THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IN THE LONG TERM IF PORTUGUESE TIMOR DID BECOME PART OF INDONESIA, WITHOUT IN ANY WAY ENDORSING THE USE OF FORCE. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT TO HAVE BEEN HIS VIEW?

ANSWER: I THINK THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF WHITLAM BETTER UNDERSTOOD US THAN THIS NEW GOVERNMENT.

QUESTION: WHY IS THAT?

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ANSWER: I THINK BECAUSE WHITLAM WAS IN GOVERNMENT AND WE DEVELOPED OUR RELATIONS. THIS NEW GOVERNMENT CAME

FROM THE OPPOSITION, AND I THINK THE CHARACTER WILL BE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT.

BUT I AM SURE THAT STRATEGICALLY THE GOVERNMENT OF TODAY NEEDS CO-OPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA.

MAYBE THERE ARE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT POLICIES WHEN COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT, BUT STRATEGICALLY I THINK THAT ESPECIALLY THE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA IS THE SAME.

MAYBE THE TACTICS WHAT THEY USE ARE DIFFERENT. MAYBE THE STRESSING IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT. MAYBE THE APPROACH IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT. BUT THE NEED FOR CO-OPERATION STILL EXISTS.

QUESTION: WHEN THE FRASER GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER LAST NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, DID YOU UNDERSTAND THEM TO HAVE A DIFFERENT TIMOR POLICY THAT THE WHITLAM GOVERNMENT?

ANSWER: NO, I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAD A DIFFERENT POLICY. AS LONG AS I AM NOT FORGETTING, YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER KNEW ABOUT DEVELOPMENT IN TIMOR EVEN WHEN HE WAS IN OPPOSITION.

I HAVE MET HIM IN THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY HERE. WHEN I VISITED AUSTRALIA IN 1973 I MET MR. FRASER, AND THE LEADER BEFORE HIM, MR. SNEDDEN.

I THINK OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED.

THE REAL THINKING ABOUT TIMOR IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MR. FRASER AND MR. WHITLAM.

QUESTION: YOU DIDN'T REALISE THERE WAS SUCH A DIFFERENCE?

ANSWER: I HAVE NOT REALISED IT UNTIL NOW.

QUESTION: MR FRASER AND MR. PEACOCK'S POLICY IS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES AND AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. IS THIS REALISTIC IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS IN TIMOR, PARTICULARLY NOW THAT IT IS A PROVINCE OF INDONESIA.

ANSWER: TODAY IT IS NOT REALISTIC ANY MORE BECAUSE THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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QUESTION IS OVER.

SUCH IDEAS CAME FROM FOREIGNERS LOOKING TO OUR PROBLEMS. AND WE KNOW THAT THE FOREIGNER CAME FROM A SOCIETY WHICH HAD SUCH IDEAS.

WE UNDERSTAND ALSO THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA FACING THE OPPOSITION, AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND SO ON.

QUESTION: YOU ARE SAYING THAT THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT

IS TRYING TO FORCE ITS VALUES ON THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT?

ANSWER: I THINK SO, YES. ITS VALUES.

QUESTION: IS THAT PATRONISING?

ANSWER: IT IS NOT PATRONISING BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENT VALUES.

THEY (AUSTRALIA) CONCEDE THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION IS NOT VIABLE LOOKING FROM THEIR OWN VALUES, BECAUSE IT MUST PROCEED BY THE MECHANISM OF SELF-DETERMINATION, ESTABLISHING A CERTAIN ORGANISATION, ONE MANE ONE VOTE, AND SO ON.

BUT THE REAL CONDITION OF TIMOR IS NOT LIKE THAT.

IT IS TRUE THAT SUCH CONDITIONS ARE APPLICABLE IN AUSTRALIA, BUT NOT IN TIMOR, BECAUSE THE SOCIETY IS DIFFERENT, THE VALUES ARE DIFFERENT.

THE PEOPLE OF TIMOR HAVE THEIR OWN VALUES, WHAT YOU CALL THE TRADITIONAL VALUES.

BUT IN AUSTRALIA YOU HAVE MODERN VALUES. BUT IF YOU LOOK IN AUSTRALIA TO THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE THERE, THE VALUES ARE TRADITIONAL.

WHY ARE THE LEADERS (IN AUSTRALIA) ARE NOT LOOKING TO THE COMPARISON IN THEIR OWN BODY AND TO THE PEOPLE OF DILI?

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QUESTION: APART FROM TIMOR, THE QUESTION HAS ARISEN OF WHAT THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER SAID IN PEKING ABOUT INDONESIA. HE APPEARED TO CAST DOUBT ON THE INDO-NESEAN GOVERNMENT BY REFERRING TO QTE THE NATURE OF THE REGIME. END QTE THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS SAID HE WAS REFERRING TO THE STRENGHT OF THE INDO-NESEAN GOVERNMENT, BUT THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME DOUBT ABOUT THIS IN JAKARTA. HAS THIS CAST AN ADDED TENSION INTO AUSTRALIAN-INDONESIAN RELATIONS?

ANSWER: WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE MANY TIMES WITH SO MANY PEOPLE. YOU HAVE MANY KINDS OF VIEW (ON THIS) IN INDONESIA.

THE PEOPLE LOOKING DEEPLY AT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE IN SUCH A MODERN SOCIETY
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AS AUSTRALIA, OF COURSE THEY ARE UPSET, BECAUSE IT LOOKED LIKE MR. FRASER DOESN'T UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION OF INDONESIA, AND DOESN'T THINK ABOUT THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA.

THAT IS FOR PEOPLE WHO DON'T UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION OF AUSTRALIA AND ESPECIALLY THE VALUES OF A MODERN SOCIETY LIKE AUSTRALIA.

BUT ME AS A SOLDIER, I KNOW WHAT KIND OF VALUES YOU HAVE IN SUCH A MODERN SOCIETY AS AUSTRALIA.

SO THE STATEMENT OF MR. FRASER WILL BE MORE FOR DOMESTIC CONSIDERATION, AND I AM SURE THAT MR. FRASER DOES NOT THINK SO BADLY ABOUT US, AND ESPECIALLY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

QUESTION: THE FRASER GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT EH RUSSIAN NAVAL BUILDUP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. HOW DO YOU VIEW THAT RUSSIAN PRESENCE?

ANSWER: I THINK IT IS ALSO THE RIGHT OF THE RUSSIANS TO BE PRESENT.

THE INDIAN OCEAN IS NOT ONLY FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES, IT IS OPEN FOR EVERY COUNTRY. WHAT IS WRONG WITH RUSSIA USING IT?

IF WE LOOK TO THE POINT OF VIEW OF MR. FRASER'S DISCUSSIONS IN PEKING, IT MUST BE TAILORED TO THE NEED OF THE DISCUSSION, AND SECOND IT MUST CONSIDER THE STRATEGICAL VALUES.

SO, IF THEY DISCUSSED THAT, IT IS A NEED FOR AUSTRALIA TO OPPOSE OR REDUCE THE RUSSIAN ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, SO IT IS ALSO A VALID POINT OF THE STRATEGY.

QUESTION: DO YOU SEE THE NEED FOR A LARGER AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN TO MATCH THE RUSSIANS?

ANSWER: STRATEGICALLY, IT IS VERY COMMON TO HAVE SUCH IDEAS. STRATEGICALLY IT IS ACCEPTABLE.

QUESTION: NEVERTHELESS, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS A POLICY OF SUPPORTING A ZONE OF PEACE AND NEUTRALITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN?

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ANSWER: THAT HAS MANY MEANINGS ACCORDING TO THE COUNTRY THAT WANTS TO EXPLAIN IT.

ACCORDING TO ME, ACCORDING TO INDONESIA, THE ZONE OF PEACE AND NEUTRALITY MEANS THAT EVERYBODY CAN USE THIS AREA, BUT NOT FOR INCREASING MILITARY POWER OR FOR CONFRONTATION.

QUESTION: THE SUGGESTION HAS BEEN RAISED OF SOME FORM OF FOUR-POWER NAVAL ARRANGEMENT CONSTITUTING AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN. IT WAS REPORTED THAT MR. FRASER HAS MADE THIS SUGGESTION. DO YOU THINK THAT REASONABLE?

ANSWER: REASONABLE FOR WHOM? FOR INDONESIA, WE ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS.

IT DEPENDS ON THE PARTNERS OF THE DISCUSSION. THE CHINESE AND THE AUSTRALIAN LEADERS ARE DISCUSSING THE SITUATION.

OF COURSE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES. BECAUSE THERE IS THE POSITION, FOR INSTANCE, OF AUSTRALIA, THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT VIS-A-VIS THE POSITION OF THE RUSSIANS.

I THINK THIS IS REASONABLE FOR STRATEGIC DISCUSSIONS, BUT IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE BY THE SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS BECAUSE IT WILL CREATE SOME EMOTIONAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

QUESTION: IN WHAT WAY?

ANSWER: IN THE SENSE OF THE ATTITUDE THAT IT LOOKS LIKE PEKING AND AUSTRALIA ARE CO-OPERATING TO FACE THE RUSSIANS.

QUESTION: IN FACT THAT HAS BEEN A CENTRAL PART OF MR. FRASER'S FOREIGN POLICY. HE HAS PUT PARTICULAR EMPHAIS ON CHINA AS A COUNTER-BALANCE TO THE RUSSIANS IN THE ASIAN AREA. DO YOU VIEW PEKING IN THE SAME LIGHT?

ANSWER: THIS IS A DIFFERENCE. THIS IDEA IS DIFFERENT WITH US. WE CONSIDER CHINA IN ASIA ALSO A SUPER-POWER.

MAYBE MR. FRASER HAS NOT CONSIDERED CHINA AS A SUPER-POWER. SO IT MEANS THAT CHINA IS ALSO A SUPER-POWER WHICH ENDANGERS THIS AREA, ACCORDING TO US. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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MAYBE FOR MR. FRASER IT IS NOT, BECAUSE HE DOESN'T CONSIDER CHINA A SUPER-POWER. THAT IS WHY HE WANTS TO USE THE CHINESE TO STOP THE OTHER SUPER-POWER MOVING INTO THE AREA.

STRATEGICALLY, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MR. FRASER, OR AUSTRALIA'S STANDPOINT, IT IS RIGHT.

BUT IT IS NOT ALWAYS ACCEPTED BY OTHER COUNTRIES LIKE THE ASEAN ONES IN THIS AREA.

QUESTION: IS IT ACCEPTED BY INDONESIA?

ANSWER: OF COURSE NOT.

QUESTION: ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT PEKING IS STILL SUPPORT-PK SUBVERSION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA?

ANSWER: IDOLOGICALLY, I THINK THEY WILL ALWAYS CONTINUE.

QUESTION: MR. FRASER CAME BACK FROM PEKING WITH THE MESSAGE THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS ASSURED HIM THEY WISHED TO SEPARATE PARTY FROM STATE. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD DEAL ON A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT BASIS, AND WHILE THERE MAY BE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND THE PARTIES OF OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ALLOW THESE TO STAND IN THE WAY OF ITS RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS. DO YOU ACCEPT THAT?

ANSWER: WE HAVE DIFFERENT VALUES. AUSTRALIA IS FURTHER FROM PEKING THAN INDONESIA. THE MOST DIFFERENCE IS IN POPULATION. AUSTRALIA BELONGS TO A WHITE POPULATION SOCIETY. WEBELONG TO ASIA.

AND IF YOU LOOK TO THIS AREA IN ASIA YOU HAVE ONLY TWO RACES, THE CHINESE AND THE NONE-CHINESE. THE NON-CHINESE ARE IN A SMALL MINORITY. THE MINORITY ALWAYS HAS A FEAR FACING THE MAJORITY.

CHINA NPNNOT SEPARATE EVEN AT THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL THE GOVERNMENT AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES. IN EVERY COM-

MUNIST GOVERNMENT THE GOVERNMENT IS OWNED BY THE POLITICAL PARTY.

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPTION OF THE PARTY IS SUPPORTING THE INSURGENCY, SUPPORTING THE FRUSTRATIONS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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OF SOCIETY IN CERTAIN NATIONS, TO ESTABLISH THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT.

IT MEANS THIS IS THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN INDONESIA WITH ITS OWN IDEOLOGY AND THE CHINESE WITH THEIR STRATEGY.

QUESTION: YOU DON'T SEE IT AS REALISTIC TO SEPARATE PARTY FROM STATE AS FAR AS CHINA IS CONCERNED?

ANSWER: IT IS NOT REALISTIC.

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QUESTION: YOU HAVE SPOKEN OF AUSTRALIA TRYING TO FORCE ITS VALUES ON INDONESIA OVER TIMOR, AND OF CLEAR DIFFERENCES WITH THE FRASER GOVERNMENT ON CHINA POLICY AND OTHER QUESTIONS. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DIFFERENCES, WHAT TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP DO YOU SEE BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA IN THE FUTURE?

ANSWER: FOR THE SAKE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WE MUST MAKE A NEW APPROACH. WE MUST DISCUSS PROBLEMS DEEPER.

IT IS ALREADY THE ROLE OF COOPERATION TO USE THE POLICY OF GIVE AND TAKE, OF ACCOMMODATION, BUT NOT TO IMPOSE IDEAS.

I THINK THAT AFTER WE HAVE DISCUSSED SO MANY DIFFICULTIES THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS BY MORE DISCUSSION BETWEEN LEADERS OF AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA.
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END QTE.

15. COMMENT: IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY MURTOPO GAVE THIS INTERVIEW TO A MAJOR AUSTRALIAN NEWSPAPER WHICH HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED THE INDONESIAN TAKEOVER OF TIMOR. THE FRASER GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED TO KEEP ITS CRITICISM OF THE INDONESIAN TAKEOVER OF TIMOR AS LOW KEY AS POSSIBLE. MURTOPO'S INTERVIEW MAKES IT APPEAR THAT AUSTRALIAN VIEWS OF THE TAKEOVER ARE A MORE SERIOUS IRRITANT IN AUSTRALIA-INDONESIA RELATIONS THAN THE FRASER GOVERNMENT WANTS THEM TO BE. INDEED HIS INTERVIEW MAY WELL HAVE SUCCEEDED IN MAKING IT A MORE SERIOUS IRRITANT. MURTOPO'S ASSERTION THAT THE WHITLAM GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD INDONESIA BETTER THAN DOES THE FRASER GOVERNMENT WILL ALSO DO LITTLE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
END COMMENT.
HARGROVE

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Message Attributes

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Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
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